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Theoretical Economics
ISSN 1933-6837 · The Econometric Society
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Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 21 Iss. 4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 21 Iss. 4
Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence
Belief in mean reversion and the law of small numbers
Information design in smooth games
Combinator dynamics: Multidimensional evolutionary learning
Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection
Contract terms monotonicity in matching markets
Optimal auction design with contingent payments and costly verification
Semistability in roommate problems
Selling information for bilateral trade
Collaboration between and within groups
Informed communication equilibrium
Repeated games with many players
Strategic experimentation with privately observed payoffs
Adversarial coordination and public information design
Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
Innovation adoption by forward‐looking social learners
Digital currency and privacy
Relational enforcement
A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
Efficient incentives with social preferences
Extensive measurement in social choice
The persuasion duality
Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
Unrestricted information acquisition
Information design in multistage games
Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
Censorship as optimal persuasion
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems
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