Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
Theoretical Economics · 2024 · 19 (3) · 1261-1304
DOI: 10.3982/te5915 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2024. Verfasst von Guilherme Carmona und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 36 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We introduce a model of large many‐to‐one matching markets with occupational choice where each individual can choose which side of the market to belong to. We show that stable matchings exist under mild assumptions; in particular, both complementarities and externalities can be accommodated. Our model generalizes Greinecker and Kah (2021), which focuses on one‐to‐one matching and did not allow for occupational choice. Applications include the roommate problem with nonatomic participants, explaining the size and distribution of firms and wage inequality.
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APA
Carmona, G., & Laohakunakorn, K. (2024). Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice. Theoretical Economics, 19(3), 1261-1304. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5915
Vancouver
Carmona G, Laohakunakorn K. Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice. Theoretical Economics. 2024;19(3):1261-1304. doi:10.3982/te5915
BibTeX
@article{Carmona2024,
author = {Carmona, Guilherme and Laohakunakorn, Krittanai},
title = {Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {19},
number = {3},
pages = {1261--1304},
doi = {10.3982/te5915}
}
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