Consciousness and the Problem of Other Minds
Activitas Nervosa Superior · 2010
DOI: 10.1007/bf03379573 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Activitas Nervosa Superior, 2010. Written by John O’Dea. Cited 3 times so far (Crossref); 34 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
Because a conception of consciousness based on direct self-awareness does not generalise easily to other cases, a fully general theory of consciousness under this conception may not be possible, as Ned Block (2003) has pointed out. In this paper, i discuss the possibility of doing away with the underlying idea, common in philosophical and scientific circles, that consciousness is a first-person concept in the first instance, from which we infer outwards to others. i suggest that notable Phenomenological descriptions of the centrality and automaticity of our experience of others is broadly in line with the evidence from psychology and the neurosciences; recent work on possible “mirror” and related mechanisms for engaging with the mental states of others, together with behavioural and developmental studies, all undermine the inferential approach to other minds. I defend the possibility that the conception of mentality that underlies our engagement with others from infancy does not arise from self-awareness, and that if so, the way we theorise about consciousness in its most general sense may have to change.
Cite
APA
O’Dea, J. (2010). Consciousness and the Problem of Other Minds. Activitas Nervosa Superior. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf03379573
Vancouver
O’Dea J. Consciousness and the Problem of Other Minds. Activitas Nervosa Superior. 2010. doi:10.1007/bf03379573
BibTeX
@article{ODea2010,
author = {O’Dea, John},
title = {Consciousness and the Problem of Other Minds},
journal = {Activitas Nervosa Superior},
year = {2010},
doi = {10.1007/bf03379573}
}
EUVIMED