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Consciousness and the Problem of Other Minds

John O’Dea

Activitas Nervosa Superior · 2010

DOI: 10.1007/bf03379573 ↗
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Abstract Because a conception of consciousness based on direct self-awareness does not generalise easily to other cases, a fully general theory of consciousness under this conception may not be possible, as Ned Block (2003) has pointed out. In this paper, i discuss the possibility of doing away with the underlying idea, common in philosophical and scientific circles, that consciousness is a first-person concept in the first instance, from which we infer outwards to others. i suggest that notable Phenomenological descriptions of the centrality and automaticity of our experience of others is broadly in line with the evidence from psychology and the neurosciences; recent work on possible “mirror” and related mechanisms for engaging with the mental states of others, together with behavioural and developmental studies, all undermine the inferential approach to other minds. I defend the possibility that the conception of mentality that underlies our engagement with others from infancy does not arise from self-awareness, and that if so, the way we theorise about consciousness in its most general sense may have to change.

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