El Alamein, 1942: Rommel’s Anti-Climax
Military Strategy Magazine · 2012
DOI: 10.64148/msm.article.563 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Military Strategy Magazine, 2012. Verfasst von Antulio J. Echevarria.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Antulio Echevarria argues that Rommel’s generalship continuously pushed men and materiel to their limits, which precipitously wore down forces that were merely intended to provide security and stability along the flank of the main theater of operations against the Soviet Union. Rommel failed to appreciate the operational interplay between land power and air power – and his forces paid the price at El Alamein.
Zitieren
APA
Echevarria, A. J. (2012). El Alamein, 1942: Rommel’s Anti-Climax. Military Strategy Magazine. https://doi.org/10.64148/msm.article.563
Vancouver
Echevarria AJ. El Alamein, 1942: Rommel’s Anti-Climax. Military Strategy Magazine. 2012. doi:10.64148/msm.article.563
BibTeX
@article{Echevarria2012,
author = {Echevarria, Antulio J.},
title = {El Alamein, 1942: Rommel’s Anti-Climax},
journal = {Military Strategy Magazine},
year = {2012},
doi = {10.64148/msm.article.563}
}
EUVIMED