A new approach to the analysis of cooperation under the shadow of the future: Theory and experimental evidence
Quantitative Economics · 2026 · 17 (3) · 827-857
DOI: 10.3982/qe2768 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Quantitative Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Melis Kartal und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 70 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Universität Wien.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The theory of infinitely repeated games may lack predictive power due to its insensitivity to, for example, changes in some game parameters, the timing of players' moves, and communication possibilities. We propose a new approach by studying an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game and its variants where preferences for cooperation are heterogeneous, and strategic risk arises from incomplete information about opponents' preferences. Our model generates a rich set of comparative static predictions in a variety of settings. We show that, unlike standard theory and other existing models, our approach organizes the findings of a host of experiments including our novel experiments.
Förderung
- Universität Wien
Zitieren
APA
Kartal, M., & Müller, W. (2026). A new approach to the analysis of cooperation under the shadow of the future: Theory and experimental evidence. Quantitative Economics, 17(3), 827-857. https://doi.org/10.3982/qe2768
Vancouver
Kartal M, Müller W. A new approach to the analysis of cooperation under the shadow of the future: Theory and experimental evidence. Quantitative Economics. 2026;17(3):827-857. doi:10.3982/qe2768
BibTeX
@article{Kartal2026,
author = {Kartal, Melis and Müller, Wieland},
title = {A new approach to the analysis of cooperation under the shadow of the future: Theory and experimental evidence},
journal = {Quantitative Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {17},
number = {3},
pages = {827--857},
doi = {10.3982/qe2768}
}
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