Making Subsidies Work: Rules versus Discretion
Econometrica · 2025 · 93 (3) · 747-778
DOI: 10.3982/ecta21319 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Econometrica, 2025. Verfasst von Federico Cingano und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 18-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 76 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: European Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We estimate the employment effects of a large program of public investment subsidies to private firms that ranked applicants on a score reflecting both objective rules and local politicians' discretion. Leveraging the rationing of funds as an ideal Regression Discontinuity Design, we characterize the heterogeneity of treatment effects and cost‐per‐new‐job across inframarginal firms and estimate the cost‐effectiveness of subsidies under factual and counterfactual allocations. Firms ranking high on objective rules and firms preferred by local politicians generated larger employment growth on average, but the latter did so at a higher cost per job. We estimate that relying only on objective criteria would reduce the cost per job by 11%, while relying only on political discretion would increase such cost by 42%.
Förderung
- European Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Cingano, F., Palomba, F., Pinotti, P., & Rettore, E. (2025). Making Subsidies Work: Rules versus Discretion. Econometrica, 93(3), 747-778. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta21319
Vancouver
Cingano F, Palomba F, Pinotti P, Rettore E. Making Subsidies Work: Rules versus Discretion. Econometrica. 2025;93(3):747-778. doi:10.3982/ecta21319
BibTeX
@article{Cingano2025,
author = {Cingano, Federico and Palomba, Filippo and Pinotti, Paolo and Rettore, Enrico},
title = {Making Subsidies Work: Rules versus Discretion},
journal = {Econometrica},
year = {2025},
volume = {93},
number = {3},
pages = {747--778},
doi = {10.3982/ecta21319}
}
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