Breaking BLE MAC Address Randomization with Allowlist-Based Side Channels and its Countermeasure
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security · 30.11.2025 · 28 (4) · 1-33
DOI: 10.1145/3744559 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, online erschienen am 27.09.2025. Verfasst von Yue Zhang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 68 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: NSF.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is ubiquitous today. To prevent a BLE device (e.g., a smartphone) from being connected by unknown devices, it uses allowlisting to allow the connectivity from only recognized devices. Unfortunately, we show that this allowlist feature actually introduces a side channel for device tracking, since a device with the allowed list behaves differently even though it has used randomized MAC addresses. Even worse, we also find that the current MAC address randomization scheme specified in Bluetooth protocol is flawed, suffering from a replay attack with which an attacker can replay a sniffed MAC address to probe whether a targeted device will respond or not based on its allowlist. We have validated our allowlist-based side channel attacks with 43 BLE peripheral devices, 11 centrals, and 4 development boards, and found none of them once configured with allowlisting is immune to the proposed attacks. We advocate the use of an interval unpredictable, central and peripheral synchronized random MAC address randomization scheme to defeat passive device tracking (introducing 1% power consumption overhead for centrals and 6.75% for peripherals, and 88.49 μs performance overhead for centrals and 94.46 μs for peripherals), and the use of timestamps to derive randomized MAC addresses such that attackers can no longer be able to replay them to defeat active device tracking (introducing 3.04% overhead for peripherals, and 63.58 μs and 20.54 μs performance overhead for centrals and peripherals). Our field testing with a long range Bluetooth sniffer shows that 16,422 of 100,101 sniffed devices are subject to our BAT attacks. We have disclosed our findings to Bluetooth SIG and many other stakeholders in October 2020. Bluetooth SIG assigned CVE-2020-35473 to track this logical-level protocol flaw. Google assigned our findings as a high severity design flaw and awarded us with a bug bounty.
Förderung
- NSF
Zitieren
APA
Zhang, Y., & Lin, Z. (2025). Breaking BLE MAC Address Randomization with Allowlist-Based Side Channels and its Countermeasure. ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, 28(4), 1-33. https://doi.org/10.1145/3744559
Vancouver
Zhang Y, Lin Z. Breaking BLE MAC Address Randomization with Allowlist-Based Side Channels and its Countermeasure. ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security. 2025;28(4):1-33. doi:10.1145/3744559
BibTeX
@article{Zhang2025,
author = {Zhang, Yue and Lin, Zhiqiang},
title = {Breaking BLE MAC Address Randomization with Allowlist-Based Side Channels and its Countermeasure},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security},
year = {2025},
volume = {28},
number = {4},
pages = {1--33},
doi = {10.1145/3744559}
}
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