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Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist

Nomy Arpaly

Philosophical Issues · 2023-10 · 33 (1) · 22-32

DOI: 10.1111/phis.12239 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophical Issues, online erschienen am 21.08.2023. Verfasst von Nomy Arpaly. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 20 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

I argue that unless belief is voluntary in a very strict sense – that is, unless credence is simply under our direct control – there can be no practical reasons to believe. I defend this view against recent work by Susanna Rinard. I then argue that for very similar reasons, barring the truth of strict doxastic voluntarism, there cannot be epistemic reasons to act, only purely practical reasons possessed by those whose goal is attaining knowledge or justified belief.

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APA

Arpaly, N. (2023). Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist. Philosophical Issues, 33(1), 22-32. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12239

Vancouver

Arpaly N. Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist. Philosophical Issues. 2023;33(1):22-32. doi:10.1111/phis.12239

BibTeX
@article{Arpaly2023,
  author = {Arpaly, Nomy},
  title = {Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist},
  journal = {Philosophical Issues},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {33},
  number = {1},
  pages = {22--32},
  doi = {10.1111/phis.12239}
}
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