Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs
Philosophical Issues · 2019-10 · 29 (1) · 9-23
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12137 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophical Issues, online erschienen am 24.09.2019. Verfasst von Rima Basu. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 117-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 36 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically racist belief reflects a failure to not only attend to the epistemic risk of being wrong, but also a failure to attend to the distinctively moral risk of wronging others given what we believe.
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APA
Basu, R. (2019). Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), 9-23. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12137
Vancouver
Basu R. Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs. Philosophical Issues. 2019;29(1):9-23. doi:10.1111/phis.12137
BibTeX
@article{Basu2019,
author = {Basu, Rima},
title = {Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs},
journal = {Philosophical Issues},
year = {2019},
volume = {29},
number = {1},
pages = {9--23},
doi = {10.1111/phis.12137}
}
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