Against Metaphysical Egalitarianism
Analytic Philosophy · 2026-12 · 67 (4) · 297-308
DOI: 10.1111/phib.12388 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analytic Philosophy, online erschienen am 21.07.2025. Verfasst von Peter W. Finocchiaro. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Many philosophers think that a metaphysical theory should be evaluated by the degree to which its ideology accurately represents the fundamental structure of reality. But that position pushes them to make seemingly invidious metaphysical distinctions. For instance: is a metaphysical theory that employs logical conjunction better than one that employs logical disjunction? In this paper, I evaluate a prominent solution to this problem: metaphysical egalitarianism. According to metaphysical egalitarianism, the best theory is the theory that avoids making seemingly invidious metaphysical distinctions by employing both logical conjunction and logical disjunction. I argue that metaphysical egalitarianism should be rejected, primarily because it neglects the disvalue of employing inaccurate ideology.
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APA
Finocchiaro, P. W. (2026). Against Metaphysical Egalitarianism. Analytic Philosophy, 67(4), 297-308. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12388
Vancouver
Finocchiaro PW. Against Metaphysical Egalitarianism. Analytic Philosophy. 2026;67(4):297-308. doi:10.1111/phib.12388
BibTeX
@article{Finocchiaro2026,
author = {Finocchiaro, Peter W.},
title = {Against Metaphysical Egalitarianism},
journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {67},
number = {4},
pages = {297--308},
doi = {10.1111/phib.12388}
}
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