The Form of Agency
Noûs · 2026-12 · 60 (4) · 875-889
DOI: 10.1111/nous.70044 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Noûs, online erschienen am 10.04.2026. Verfasst von William Hornett. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 101 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Philosophers often think agency is essentially connected with rationality, intention, or control. However, Minimalists argue that agency is just the power to cause a change; acids and boulders are agents too. Many philosophers treat Minimalism as a wild outlier, assuming its falsity without argument. My paper has three main aims: first, to show that Minimalism is actually an incredibly plausible theory; second, to show that it is false; and third, to defend an alternative theory of agency. I begin by providing a new argument for thinking that Minimalism is attractive as the default view of agency. I then argue that despite this attraction it is wrong, and I use it as a foil to defend my own view that agency is the distinctively animal power of discretion. I do this by first arguing for Deflationism about refraining, and then showing that this supports an argument for thinking that agency is a kind of two‐way power. Finally, I show how to arbitrate disputes about the extent of agency, as well as arguing that, if I am right about agency's nature, then it is prevalent throughout the animal kingdom.
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APA
Hornett, W. (2026). The Form of Agency. Noûs, 60(4), 875-889. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70044
Vancouver
Hornett W. The Form of Agency. Noûs. 2026;60(4):875-889. doi:10.1111/nous.70044
BibTeX
@article{Hornett2026,
author = {Hornett, William},
title = {The Form of Agency},
journal = {Noûs},
year = {2026},
volume = {60},
number = {4},
pages = {875--889},
doi = {10.1111/nous.70044}
}
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