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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

The Voting Premium

DORON LEVIT, NADYA MALENKO, ERNST MAUG

The Journal of Finance · 2026-06 · 81 (3) · 1321-1375

DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70037 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 30.03.2026. Verfasst von DORON LEVIT und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 104 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders. Our theory reconciles conflicting empirical findings by showing that standard measures of the voting premium often misrepresent the true value of voting rights, increased conflicts between the blockholder and small shareholders do not necessarily raise the voting premium, and the voting premium can even turn negative when small shareholders free‐ride on the blockholder's trades.

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APA

LEVIT, D., MALENKO, N., & MAUG, E. (2026). The Voting Premium. The Journal of Finance, 81(3), 1321-1375. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70037

Vancouver

LEVIT D, MALENKO N, MAUG E. The Voting Premium. The Journal of Finance. 2026;81(3):1321-1375. doi:10.1111/jofi.70037

BibTeX
@article{LEVIT2026,
  author = {LEVIT, DORON and MALENKO, NADYA and MAUG, ERNST},
  title = {The Voting Premium},
  journal = {The Journal of Finance},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {81},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1321--1375},
  doi = {10.1111/jofi.70037}
}
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