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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Auctions versus Negotiations: The Role of the Payment Structure

FLORIAN HOFFMANN, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV

The Journal of Finance · 2025-06 · 80 (3) · 1769-1813

DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13446 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 07.04.2025. Verfasst von FLORIAN HOFFMANN und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 66 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We investigate a seller's strategic choice between optimally structured negotiations with fewer bidders and an auction with more competing bidders when payments can have a contingent component, as is common in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), patent licensing, and employee compensation. The key factor favoring negotiations is that it allows the seller to set her preferred payment structure—that is, the revenue‐maximizing mix of cash and contingent pay; reserve prices are of secondary importance. Negotiations are more likely to dominate if synergies increase in bidders' productivity types (as with acquirer‐target complementarities in M&A). Higher dispersion and magnitude of bidders' private valuations also favor negotiations.

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APA

HOFFMANN, F., & VLADIMIROV, V. (2025). Auctions versus Negotiations: The Role of the Payment Structure. The Journal of Finance, 80(3), 1769-1813. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13446

Vancouver

HOFFMANN F, VLADIMIROV V. Auctions versus Negotiations: The Role of the Payment Structure. The Journal of Finance. 2025;80(3):1769-1813. doi:10.1111/jofi.13446

BibTeX
@article{HOFFMANN2025,
  author = {HOFFMANN, FLORIAN and VLADIMIROV, VLADIMIR},
  title = {Auctions versus Negotiations: The Role of the Payment Structure},
  journal = {The Journal of Finance},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {80},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1769--1813},
  doi = {10.1111/jofi.13446}
}
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