Founder‐CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital‐Backed Entrepreneurship
The Journal of Finance · 2024-10 · 79 (5) · 3361-3405
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13383 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 22.08.2024. Verfasst von MICHAEL EWENS und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 33 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We show theoretically that a critical determinant of the attractiveness of venture capital (VC)‐backed entrepreneurship for high‐earning potential founders is the expected time to develop a startup's initial product. This is because founder‐CEOs' cash compensation increases substantially after product development, alleviating the nondiversifiable risk that founders face at startup birth. Consistent with the model's predictions of where the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely to be most constrained, we find that technological shocks differentially altering the expected time to product across industries can explain changes in both the rate of entry and characteristics of individuals selecting into VC‐backed entrepreneurship.
Zitieren
APA
EWENS, M., NANDA, R., & STANTON, C. (2024). Founder‐CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital‐Backed Entrepreneurship. The Journal of Finance, 79(5), 3361-3405. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13383
Vancouver
EWENS M, NANDA R, STANTON C. Founder‐CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital‐Backed Entrepreneurship. The Journal of Finance. 2024;79(5):3361-3405. doi:10.1111/jofi.13383
BibTeX
@article{EWENS2024,
author = {EWENS, MICHAEL and NANDA, RAMANA and STANTON, CHRISTOPHER},
title = {Founder‐CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital‐Backed Entrepreneurship},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {79},
number = {5},
pages = {3361--3405},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13383}
}
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