SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT
Economic Inquiry · 2021-01 · 59 (1) · 287-299
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12929 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economic Inquiry, online erschienen am 23.07.2020. Verfasst von Jac C. Heckelman und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 19 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Young developed a classic axiomatization of the Borda rule almost 50 years ago. He proved it is the only voting rule satisfying the normative properties of decisiveness, neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness and cancellation. Often overlooked is that the uniqueness of Borda applies only to variable populations. We present a different set of properties which only Borda satisfies when both the set of voters and the set of alternatives can vary. It is also shown Borda is the only scoring rule which will satisfy all of the new properties when the number of voters stays fixed. ( JEL D71, D02, H00)
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APA
Heckelman, J. C., & Ragan, R. (2021). SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT. Economic Inquiry, 59(1), 287-299. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12929
Vancouver
Heckelman JC, Ragan R. SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT. Economic Inquiry. 2021;59(1):287-299. doi:10.1111/ecin.12929
BibTeX
@article{Heckelman2021,
author = {Heckelman, Jac C. and Ragan, Robi},
title = {SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT},
journal = {Economic Inquiry},
year = {2021},
volume = {59},
number = {1},
pages = {287--299},
doi = {10.1111/ecin.12929}
}
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