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Who should pay for ESG ratings?

Stefano Lovo, Jacques Olivier

Review of Finance · 01.03.2026 · 30 (2) · 597-637

DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfaf060 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 29.10.2025. Verfasst von Stefano Lovo und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: HEC Center for Impact Finance Research.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We model how a profit-maximizing rating agency decides whether to sell Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) ratings to firms or investors. For firms in sufficiently green sectors or when the proportion of socially responsible investors is large enough, ESG ratings increase expected stock prices, and the “issuer pays” business model is more profitable than “investors pay.” When all investors are socially responsible, the model coincides with a model of credit ratings, explaining why credit ratings are sold to issuers while most ESG ratings are sold to investors. Ratings have a positive effect on firms’ ESG performance, which is maximized when investors’ preferences are heterogeneous.

Förderung

  • HEC Center for Impact Finance Research

Zitieren

APA

Lovo, S., & Olivier, J. (2026). Who should pay for ESG ratings?. Review of Finance, 30(2), 597-637. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfaf060

Vancouver

Lovo S, Olivier J. Who should pay for ESG ratings?. Review of Finance. 2026;30(2):597-637. doi:10.1093/rof/rfaf060

BibTeX
@article{Lovo2026,
  author = {Lovo, Stefano and Olivier, Jacques},
  title = {Who should pay for ESG ratings?},
  journal = {Review of Finance},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {30},
  number = {2},
  pages = {597--637},
  doi = {10.1093/rof/rfaf060}
}
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