Paying off the competition: contracting, market power, and innovation incentives
Review of Finance · 01.07.2026 · 30 (4) · 1261-1293
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfaf030 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 23.06.2025. Verfasst von Xuelin Li und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 64 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article explores the relationship between a firm’s legal contracting environment and its innovation incentives. Using granular data from the pharmaceutical industry, we examine a contracting mechanism through which incumbents maintain market power: “pay-for-delay” agreements to delay the market entry of competitors. Exploiting a shock where such contracts become legally tenuous, we find that affected incumbents subsequently increase their innovation activity across a variety of project-level measures. Exploring the nature of this innovation, we also find that it is more “impactful” from a scientific and commercial standpoint. The results provide novel evidence that restricting the contracting space can boost innovation at the firm level. However, at the extensive margin we find a reduction in innovation by new entrants in response to increased competition, suggesting a nuanced effect on aggregate innovation.
Förderung
- MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering
Zitieren
APA
Li, X., Lo, A. W., & Thakor, R. T. (2026). Paying off the competition: contracting, market power, and innovation incentives. Review of Finance, 30(4), 1261-1293. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfaf030
Vancouver
Li X, Lo AW, Thakor RT. Paying off the competition: contracting, market power, and innovation incentives. Review of Finance. 2026;30(4):1261-1293. doi:10.1093/rof/rfaf030
BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
author = {Li, Xuelin and Lo, Andrew W and Thakor, Richard T},
title = {Paying off the competition: contracting, market power, and innovation incentives},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
number = {4},
pages = {1261--1293},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfaf030}
}
EUVIMED