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Weapons of Mass Deterrence: How Nuclear Threats Succeed

Julian Wucherpfennig, Christian Gläßel, Felix Lemmer, Dino Kolonić

Journal of Global Security Studies · 12.01.2026 · 11 (1)

DOI: 10.1093/jogss/ogag003 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Global Security Studies, online erschienen am 17.04.2026. Verfasst von Julian Wucherpfennig und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 98 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Stanton Foundation.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022 has put nuclear security back in the spotlight, especially through Russian nuclear threats intended to undermine and deter European arms delivery to Ukraine, ranging from battle tanks to cruise missiles to fighter jets. While a growing body of literature has examined the conditions under which nuclear weapons use is publicly endorsed, surprisingly little is known about the recipient effects of nuclear threats. We argue and demonstrate that such threats can deter populations in the target state, instill fears of escalation, and induce public preferences for security policies of restraint. To understand the mechanisms of why and how nuclear threats succeed, we devise a large-scale public opinion survey in Germany, centering on the debate on military support to Ukraine—which Russian nuclear threats seek to deter. Our findings demonstrate that (i) large shares of the public deem Russian nuclear threats as credible, and that (ii) perceived credibility exerts a strong negative effect on public support for the delivery of modern weapon systems to Ukraine, suggesting that nuclear coercion can work indirectly, by shaping the domestic constraints within which democratic leaders operate. Finally, we find that nuclear threat capability is remarkably resistant to experimental manipulation.

Förderung

  • Stanton Foundation

Zitieren

APA

Wucherpfennig, J., Gläßel, C., Lemmer, F., & Kolonić, D. (2026). Weapons of Mass Deterrence: How Nuclear Threats Succeed. Journal of Global Security Studies, 11(1). https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogag003

Vancouver

Wucherpfennig J, Gläßel C, Lemmer F, Kolonić D. Weapons of Mass Deterrence: How Nuclear Threats Succeed. Journal of Global Security Studies. 2026;11(1). doi:10.1093/jogss/ogag003

BibTeX
@article{Wucherpfennig2026,
  author = {Wucherpfennig, Julian and Gläßel, Christian and Lemmer, Felix and Kolonić, Dino},
  title = {Weapons of Mass Deterrence: How Nuclear Threats Succeed},
  journal = {Journal of Global Security Studies},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {11},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.1093/jogss/ogag003}
}
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